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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a two-round k-out-of-n oblivious transfer scheme with
the minimum communication cost. In our proposed scheme, the messages sent
by the receiver R to the sender S consist of only three elements, which is in-
dependent of n and k, while the messages from S to R are (n + 1) elements
when the sender holds n secrets. Our scheme features a nice property of uni-
versal parameter, where the system parameter can be used by all senders and
receivers. The proposed k-out-of-n oblivious transfer scheme is the most effi-
cient two-round scheme in terms of the number of messages transferred between
two communicating parties in known constructions. The scheme preserves the
privacy of receiver’s choice and sender’s security.
Keywords: Oblivious Transfer, Privacy, Minimum Communication Cost,
Encryption.
1. Introduction
Oblivious transfer (OT) is one of the most important building blocks to con-
struct secure and privacy-preserving protocols in cryptography, such as contract
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signing [11], private information retrieval [6] and secure function evaluation [12].
An oblivious transfer scheme is a two-party protocol between a sender S and
a receiver R. The sender holds several secrets and the receiver wants to obtain
some of them in the way that the receiver gets the secrets of his/her choice only,
without revealing anything about his choice to the sender. The sender should
not know which secrets are obtained by the receiver. The first OT scheme was
proposed by Rabin [32], where the sender sends a secret to the receiver, and
the receiver obtains the secret with probability 1/2. Even, Goldreich and Lem-
pel [11] gave a more general OT scheme called 1-out-of-2 OT (OT12) where the
sender has two one-bit secrets (m0,m1). Brassard, Crépeau and Robert [4] ex-
tended the OT12 to 1-out-of-n OT (OT
1
n) where the sender holds n secrets and
the receiver wants to obtain one of them of its choice.
In OT schemes, one of the most general types is k-out-of-n oblivious transfer
(OTkn), where the sender holds n different secrets and the receiver wants to
obtain k (k < n) secrets simultaneously1. As the large bandwidth resource
is not always available and usually expensive, it is desired to reduce the total
communication cost as much as possible during the communication. Many OTkn
schemes [28, 8, 7, 15, 14, 27, 34] have been studied. In these schemes, the ideal
communication rounds can be two only. Supposing the indices of secrets and
system parameters are known by the sender and the receiver, the receiver sends
her/his choice as a request to the sender in the first round, then the sender
should respond the request in the second round2.
From the state-of-art two-round OTkn schemes in the literature, the most
efficient one with the minimum number of messages from R to S was proposed
by Guo, Mu and Susilo in [15]. The authors first presented an efficient subset
membership encryption scheme (SME) and applied the SME scheme to con-
1The OTkn scheme with such features is called non-adaptive OT
k
n.
2We refer one communication (a flow of information transmission) between two parties
as one round in this paper. Thus the ideal communication rounds OT schemes under this
definition is ”two-round” OT schemes.
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struct an efficient OTkn scheme. In their scheme, the receiver sends only three
messages to the sender, which is independent of k and n. While the tradeoff
is that the messages from S to R are 2n, which is larger than the other OT kn
schemes. Chu and Tzeng [7] proposed an efficient OTkn scheme based on [29].
Their scheme achieves the minimum number of messages from S to R, namely
n + k, in the known constructions. But the messages from R to S in [7] are
linear in the receiver’s choice k.
1.1. Ideal Communication Cost
In the OTkn schemes with ideal communication rounds, as the sender holds
n secrets and does not know the receiver’s choice, S has to send the messages
including n encrypted secrets to R. To decrypt the ciphertext successfully,
the messages from S to R should be O(n). For example, to encrypt a secret
using ElGamal encryption, the ciphertext consists of two elements. One of
them is used to recover the encryption key. Thus, in a secure OTkn scheme,
the ideal communication cost is that the messages from R to S are constant
which is independent of n and k, and the messages from S to R is (n + 1) in
public key cryptosystems. The additional one element is used to recover the
decryption keys. From the above, we note that both schemes in [15] and [7]
cannot achieve ideal communication cost. The scheme in [15] achieves ideal
communication cost from R to S, but cannot achieve that from S to R. While
the scheme in [7] does not possess this property in any round. There are no
existing known constructions of secure OTkn in the literature can achieve the
ideal communication cost.
1.2. Our Contributions
In this paper we propose the first two-round OTkn scheme with ideal com-
munication cost; precisely, the messages from R to S are constant, with only
three elements which are independent of n and k, and the messages from S to
R contain n + 1 elements. Compared with the two-round OTkn schemes in the
literature, our proposed OTkn scheme is the most efficient one in terms of each
3
Table 1: Comparison of two-round OTkn schemes in terms of communication cost.
System Parameter Messages Messages
(R→ S) (S → R)
Mu et al. [27] 2n|Zp| 2n 2n
Zhang and Wang [34] |G| k + 3 2n
Chu and Tzeng [8] |G| k n+ k + 1
Chu and Tzeng [7] |G| k n+ k
Guo et al. [14] (n2 + 3n+ 3)|G|+ |GT | 4 3n
Guo et al. [15] (n+ 1)|G| 3 2n
Ours (2n+ 2)|G| 3 n+ 1
round. The system parameter in our scheme is universal, which can be used by
any users. We give an overview of the comparing results in Table 1.
In the first round, the receiver sends a token which contains the receiver’s
choice, and a proof information which is used to prove that its choice is not
larger than k to the sender. In the second round, the sender responds with
encrypted secrets after checking the validity of the received token. Finally, the
receiver uses its choice set and secret key to decrypt the ciphertext and only
retrieves the secrets whose indexes are in its choice set. To analyze the security
of our proposed scheme, we propose two new assumptions and prove that our
proposed assumptions are hard in the generic group model. Based on these
two assumptions, we derive the security of our proposed scheme under three
non-adaptive games and show that our scheme is unconditionally secure for
receiver’s choice and preserves the sender’s security. Any choice larger than k
can be detected easily by the sender. The tradeoff of our scheme is that the
system parameter consists of 2n+ 2 elements in the group G.
1.3. Other Related Work
The notion of oblivious transfer was put forth by Rabin [32] to achieve secure
two-party communication, and the author proposed a bit-OT protocol based on
4
quadratic roots modulo a composite. Even et al. [11] extended this notion to
OT12, where the sender holds two one-bit secrets and the receiver would like
to receive one of them of his choice. Brassard et al. [4] presented a more
general OT1n scheme, which is also known as “all-or-nothing disclosure of secrets
(ANDOS)”. After that, several oblivious transfer variants have been proposed.
They mainly focused on improving the efficiency of secure computation and
security.
Oblivious transfer with adaptive queries was proposed by Naor and Pinkas
[28] where the receiver can query the ith value depending on the first i−1 values.
In this setting, it requires two phases, the commitment phase and the transfer
phase. S first should commit all secrets to R in the commitment phase, and then
R makes queries of the secret one by one in the transfer phase. Adaptive OT
scheme has many applications, such as oblivious search and oblivious database
queries. Ogata and Kurosawa [31] proposed an efficient adaptive OT based on
the RSA system. Chu and Tzeng [8] proposed an adaptive OTkn scheme based on
basic cryptographic techniques, which is as efficient as the scheme in [31]. Ca-
menisch, Neven and Shelat [5] presented simulatable adaptive oblivious transfer
schemes that achieve a stronger security notion. They used the technique of
blind signatures and both sender and receiver security can be fully simulated
in their scheme. Green and Hohenberger [13] proposed a simulatable oblivious
transfer based on blind identity-based encryption. Further research along this
line appears in [22, 20, 33].
To solve the problem of that given a small number of oblivious transfers, how
to implement a large number of oblivious transfers, Ishai et al. [17] proposed the
first two efficient oblivious transfer extension protocols. Their first protocol is
only secure against semi-honest (positive) adversaries. The improvements and
optimizations to this protocol were given in [1, 18]. To achieve the security for
malicious (active) adversaries, the authors used the cut-and-choose technique
and proposed the second OT extension protocol. After that, constructing an
efficient OT extension protocol that is secure against malicious adversaries has
been extensively studied. There are some approaches to achieve security against
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malicious adversaries for OT extensions, but most of them were built on the
semi-honest protocol of [17] and added the consistency checks.
Nielsen et al. [30] proposed an alternative approach for achieving actively-
secure OT extension in the random oracle model. They checked the consistency
by hashing the strings that were transferred in the base-OTs and it was very
efficient. Larraia [21] introduced a new approach to constructing OT extension
schemes, which can be proved secure against malicious adversaries without the
random oracle. Asharov et al. [2] presented a more efficient OT extension
protocol for the setting of malicious adversaries. Their protocol requires less
communication than previous works and can be proved secure with or without
random oracles.
The technique of cut-and-choose has been regarded as a useful basic block
to construct the two-party protocols against malicious adversaries, and formal-
ized and proven secure by Lindell and Pinkas [24]. A number of cut-and-choose
oblivious transfer protocols [25, 26, 23, 16] have focused on reducing the con-
crete overhead of the cut-and-choose approach. Kolesnikov and Kumaresan [19]
proposed an efficient cut-and-choose OT scheme and its variants with small
concrete communication overhead in an OT-hybrid model.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
show some preliminaries including notations, the definition of OTkn scheme and
the corresponding security models. In Section 3, we first review the bilinear
map and aggregation algorithm. We then present the OTkn construction and
evaluate the scheme. We give two new complexity assumptions in Section 4.
The security analysis of the proposed scheme is presented in Section 5 and we
conclude the paper in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we give the definition of OT scheme and its security require-
ments. Before describing the definitions, we give some notations that will be
used in the remaining sections.
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Table 2: Notations
Symbol Description
λ Security parameter.
SP System parameter.
M Secret set held by the sender.
G Selected index set by the receiver.
sk Secret key held by the receiver.
P(G) Token.
Σ Proof information.
CT Ciphertext.
|G| The number of elements in G.
[n] Set {1, 2, · · · , n}.
G,GT Cyclic multiplicative groups.
|G| The size of group G.
p A large prime number.
Zp Set {0, 1, 2, · · · , p− 1}.
Z∗p Set {1, 2, · · · , p− 1}.
L\G∗ Elements in set L but not in set G∗.
2.1. Notations
Now, we present the notations and conventions used in this paper in Table
2. Let N denote the set of natural numbers. We say a function ε : N→ [0, 1] is
negligible if for every d ∈ N, there exists a λd ∈ N such that ε(λ) ≤ λ−d for all
λ > λd.
2.2. Definition of OTkn Scheme
Let m1,m2, · · · ,mn be n secrets held by the sender and receiver’s k chosen
indices are l1, l2, · · · , lk, where k < n. We assume that the sender is honest-
but-curious, that is, it will not send the secrets which are not the same as what
he claimed, including the content and the order. We borrow the idea of subset
membership encryption in [15] and give the definition of the non-adaptive OTkn
7
Inputs:
 The system parameter SP, generated by a Setup algorithm which takes
a security parameter λ as input, denoted by Setup(1λ).
 S holds a secret set M = {m1,m2, · · · ,mn}.
 R holds his choice set G = {l1, l2, · · · , lk}, where k ∈ [n].
Protocol:
1. R → S : R takes the system parameter SP and the choice set G as
input, it outputs (T, sk) where sk is a secret key and T includes a
token P(G) which contains the receiver’s choice, a proof information
Σ which is used to check the number of choice set and a number k.
Then R sends T to S.
2. S → R : S takes the system parameter SP, T and a secret set M as
input, it first checks whether |G| ≤ k via a verification algorithm and
aborts if no. If yes, it performs an encryption algorithm Encrypt and
outputs the ciphertext CT = Encrypt(SP,P(G),M). Then S sends
CT to R.
Outputs: S receives no output. R takes the system parameter SP, the
ciphertext CT , his secret key sk and the choice set G as input.
 For every i ∈ G, it outputs mi.
 For every i /∈ G, it outputs ⊥.
Figure 1: The definition of OTkn scheme
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scheme in Fig.1.
Correctness. An OTkn scheme is correct if the receiver obtains the secrets of his
choice only when the sender and the receiver follow the steps of the scheme.
2.3. Security Models
An OTkn scheme should meet the following security requirements:
 Receiver’s privacy
Given any two distinct sets of choice G0 = {l1, l2, · · · , lk0} and G1 =
{l′1, l′2, · · · , l′k1}, where k0, k1 < k, the P(G) received by the sender can not
be distinguished whether it generated under G0 or G1. That is, it is hard
to distinguish whether G = G0 or G = G1.
 Sender’s security
– Indistinguishability: Given any choice set G = {l1, l2, · · · , lk}, the
unchosen secrets are indistinguishable from the random ones. More
precisely, given (G,P(G)), a target index I∗ ∈ [n] where I∗ /∈ G, two
secrets m0,m1 (one of them is regarded as I
∗-th secret) from the
same space and a ciphertext CT ∗ generated under
(
I∗,mI∗ ,P(G)
)
where mI∗ = mc, c is randomly chosen from {0, 1}, it is hard to
distinguish whether c = 0 or c = 1.
– Accountability: Given (P(G),G, sk) satisfying |G| > k, it is hard to
generate T that passes the verification algorithm.
We define three non-adaptive security models via game playing to meet the
above security requirements. The games are defined between a challenger C and
an adversary A, which are stated as follows.
Game 1: Receiver’s privacy.
This model guarantees that the adversary (sender) learns nothing about
which indices are chosen by the receiver without a valid secret key.
 Setup: C takes as input a security parameter λ and runs the Setup algo-
rithm to generate the system parameter SP. Then it sends SP to A.
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 Challenge: A outputs two distinct choice sets G0 = {l1, l2, · · · , lk0}, G1 =
{l′1, l′2, · · · , l′k1}, where k0, k1 ≤ k. C picks a random bit c ∈ {0, 1}, sets
G = Gc and generates (P(G),G, sk). Then it computes T = (P(G),Σ, k)
and sends it to A.
 Output: A outputs its guess c′ and wins the game if c′ = c.
We define the advantage of A in winning the game as
AdvRP(λ) = |Pr[c′ = c]− 1/2|.
Definition 1. We say that an OTkn scheme preserves the privacy of receiver’s
choice with (t, ε) if for all t-probability polynomial time (PPT) adversaries, ε =
AdvRP(λ) is negligible. The choices of the receiver are unconditionally secure if
ε = 0 for all PTT adversaries.
Game 2: Sender’s security (Indistinguishability).
The model of indistinguishability captures the attack that even the adversary
(receiver) can access the secret key, it cannot retrieve the secrets whose indices
are not in the choice set.
 Init: A outputs a set G∗ = {l∗1, l∗2, · · · , l∗k} and a target index I∗ ∈ [n]\G∗
which it wants to challenge.
 Setup: C takes as input a security parameter λ and runs the Setup algo-
rithm to generate the system parameter SP. Then it sends SP to A.
 Challenge: A outputs
(
G∗,P(G∗), sk∗
)
and two secrets m0,m1 from the
same secret space for challenge. C first checks whether P(G∗) is generated
from G∗ by using the secret key sk∗. If yes, it picks a random bit c ∈ {0, 1}
and generates the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ = Encrypt(SP,P(G∗),mc) for
the secret with index I∗. It then sends CT ∗ to A. Otherwise, it aborts.
 Guess: A outputs a guess c′ and wins the game if c′ = c.
We define the advantage of A in winning the game as
AdvSS(λ) = |Pr[c′ = c]− 1/2|.
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Definition 2. An OTkn scheme preserves the indistinguishability security and it
is (t, ε)-secure if for all t-polynomial time adversaries, ε = AdvSS(λ) is negligible.
Game 3: Sender’s security (Accountability).
The accountability security guarantees that any forge proofs generated by
the choice set with number larger than k will be detected even the adversary
(receiver) knows the secret key of computing P(G).
 Setup: C takes as input a security parameter λ and runs the Setup algo-
rithm to generate the system parameter SP. Then it sends SP to A.
 Challenge: A outputs (P(G∗),G∗, sk∗) and k for challenge. P(G∗) was
generated from (G∗, sk∗) and |G∗| > k.
 Output: A outputs T ∗ = (P(G∗),Σ∗, k) and wins the game if T ∗ passes
the verification algorithm.
We define the advantage of A in winning the game as AdvA(λ) in computing
such T ∗.
Definition 3. An OTkn scheme captures the accountability security and it is
(t, ε)-secure if for all t-polynomial time adversaries, ε = AdvA(λ) is negligible.
3. Our OT kn Scheme
In this section, we present the concrete construction of our scheme. First,
we briefly review bilinear groups and the aggregation algorithm used in our
proposed scheme.
Let G, GT be two cyclic multiplicative groups of the same prime order p, g
be the generator of G. A map e : G × G → GT is said to be a bilinear map if
(1) for all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zp, we have e
(
ua, vb
)
= e(u, v)
ab
and e (g, g) 6= 1,
and there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e (g, h) for all g, h ∈ G. A
bilinear group BG = (G,GT , e, p) is composed of objects as described above.
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3.1. Aggregation Algorithm
Given group elements
(
g
1
a+1 , g
1
a+2 , · · · , g
1
a+n
)
for unknown a ∈ Z∗p, the aim
of aggregation algorithm is to compute
g
1
(a+1)(a+2)···(a+n) .
From [10], we have that there exists integers s1, s2, · · · , sn satisfying
s1
∏
i∈[n],i6=1
(a+ i) + s2
∏
i∈[n],i6=2
(a+ i) + · · ·+ sn
∏
i∈[n],i6=n
(a+ i) = 1
for all a such that we have
g
s1
a+1 · g
s2
a+2 · · · g
sn
a+n = g
s1
a+1+
s2
a+2+···
sn
a+n
= g
s1
∏
i∈[n],i 6=1 (a+i)+s2
∏
i∈[n],i 6=2 (a+i)+···+sn
∏
i∈[n],i 6=n (a+i)
(a+1)(a+2)···(a+n)
= g
1
(a+1)(a+2)···(a+n) .
The aggregation is independent of the group element g, which means it is avail-
able for all group elements as long as they are identical.
3.2. Overview of technique
In this subsection, we give a highlight of our scheme. Let BG = (G,GT , e, p)
be a bilinear group with two generators g, h ∈ G. α is known by the system
generator only. In our setting, the token P(G) = g
s
(α+l1)(α+l2)···(α+lk) and each
secret mi is encrypted using a key e
(
g
1
α+i , h
)r
, that is Ci = e
(
g
1
α+i , h
)r
·mi.
If i ∈ G, h
(α+l1)(α+l2)···(α+lk)
(α+i) is computable from the system parameters. Thus,
the decryptor can retrieve the encryption (decryption) key e
(
g
1
α+i , h
)r
together
with P(G)r and its private key s. If i /∈ G, the value of h
(α+l1)(α+l2)···(α+lk)
(α+i) cannot
be computed. Therefore, the decryptor is unable to retrieve the encryption key
and get the corresponding secret.
3.3. Construction
The concrete OTkn scheme is illustrated in Fig.2. A trusted third party
called PKG establishes the system by choosing a security parameter λ and a
12
Inputs:
 System parameter SP . The PKG runs the Setup algorithm as fol-
low. Given a security parameter λ, this algorithm generates a bilin-
ear group BG = (G,GT , e, p) with two generators g, h ∈ G. Then
it randomly chooses α ∈ Z∗p as the system secret key and computes
gi = g
1
α+i , hi = h
αi for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n. The system parameter SP
consists of (BG, g, h, g1, g2, · · · , gn, h1, h2, · · · , hn).
 S holds a set of secrets M = {m1,m2, · · · ,mn} ∈ GT .
 R holds his choice set G = {l1, l2, · · · , lk} ⊂ [n].
Protocol:
1. R → S : Given a choice set G = {l1, l2, · · · , lk} and the system pa-
rameters SP , R picks a random s ∈ Z∗p as his secret key sk and uses
the Aggregation algorithm to compute
P(G) = g
s
(α+l1)(α+l2)···(α+lk) , Σ = h
(α+l1)(α+l2)···(α+lk)·α
n−k
s ,
and sets T = (P(G),Σ, k).
2. S → R : S runs the Encrypt algorithm as follow. Given a set
T = (P(G),Σ, k), a set of secrets M = {m1,m2, · · · , mn} and the
system parameter SP , it first performs the verification algorithm as:
e
(
P(G),Σ
)
= e
(
g, hα
n−k
)
. If the equation does not hold, it aborts.
Otherwise, it accepts |G| ≤ k. Then it picks a random r ∈ Z∗p and
computes the ciphertext CT for the secrets as
C0 = P(G)
r
= g
rs
(α+l1)(α+l2)···(α+lk)
together with, for each i = 1, 2, · · · , n:
Ci = e
(
g
1
α+i , h
)r
·mi.
Outputs: R runs the decryption algorithm as follow. Given a ciphertext
CT = (C0, C1, · · · , Cn), a choice set G = {l1, l2, · · · , lk}, a secret key sk
and the system parameter SP , for each i ∈ G, R computes
mi = Ci · e
(
C0, h
(α+l1)(α+l2)···(α+lk)
(α+i)
)− 1sk
.
Figure 2: Our OTkn scheme
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random α as the system secret key, and generates the system parameter SP =
(BG, g, h, g1, g2, · · · , gn, h1, h2, · · · , hn), which is public known.
In the first round, the receiver chooses a random s ∈ Z∗p as its secret key and
a set G = {l1, l2, · · · , lk}. It then uses the Aggregation algorithm to compute
a token P(G) = g
s
(α+l1)(α+l2)···(α+lk) , and computes a proof information Σ =
h
(α+l1)(α+l2)···(α+lk)·α
n−k
s for its choice set G.
In the second round, upon receiving a request from a receiver, the sender first
tests whether e
(
P(G),Σ
)
= e
(
g, hα
n−k
)
and aborts if no. Otherwise, S picks a
random r ∈ Z∗p and computes a ciphertext CT for the secrets as C0 = P(G)
r
=
g
rs
(α+l1)(α+l2)···(α+lk) together with, for each i = 1, 2, · · · , n: Ci = e
(
g
1
α+i , h
)r
·mi.
Once receiving the encrypted secrets CT from the sender, the receiver, for
each i ∈ G, computes mi = Ci · e
(
C0, h
(α+l1)(α+l2)···(α+lk)
(α+i)
)− 1sk
. After the
decryption, R gets only k secrets with indexes in G from S.
3.4. Correctness
Below we show that our construction meets the correctness requirements.
When everything is computed as above, if |G| ≤ k, we have
e
(
P(G),Σ
)
= e
(
g
s
(α+l1)(α+l2)···(α+lk) , h
(α+l1)(α+l2)···(α+lk)·α
n−k
s
)
= e
(
g, hα
n−k
)
.
If |G| > k, it is impossible for receiver to compute the Σ which passes the check-
ing process. In decryption phase, if i ∈ G, we can compute h
(α+l1)(α+l2)···(α+lk)
(α+i)
from the system parameter, thus we have
Ci · e
(
C0, h
(α+l1)(α+l2)···(α+lk)
(α+i)
)− 1sk
= mi · e
(
g
1
α+i , h
)r
· e
(
g
rs
(α+l1)(α+l2)···(α+lk) , h
(α+l1)(α+l2)···(α+lk)
(α+i)
)− 1s
= mi · e
(
g
1
α+i , h
)r
· e
(
g
1
α+i , h
)−r
= mi · e(g, h)r(
1
α+i−
1
α+i )
= mi.
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3.5. Evaluation
Our proposed two-round OTkn scheme is very efficient in terms of communi-
cation cost. In our construction, the receiver only sends two group elements and
one integer to the sender. The overhead from R to S is the same as the most
efficient one [15] in the literature, which is independent of n and k. While, in
the second round, the transfer messages from S to R are n+ 1, more precisely,
one element in G and n elements in GT . Our scheme achieves the minimum
communication overhead in both two rounds comparing with the existing known
OTkn schemes and achieves the ideal communication cost in public key setting.
The total communication cost in our scheme is n + 4 elements, namely 3|G|,
n|GT | and |Zp|. The size of the system parameter in our scheme is linear in the
number of the secrets held by the sender.
Note that in our construction, to avoid sending linear messages to the sender
and achieving constant overhead, the receiver requires performing the Aggrega-
tion algorithm once which is expensive and k times exponentiation operations in
G. We stress that it is a tradeoff. To reduce the communication overhead, the
price to pay is to execute more computation. For the sender, as we described
above, without knowing which secrets are required, it has to encrypt and send
all secrets, which requires performing one group exponentiation operation in G
and n exponentiation operations in GT .
In the decryption phase, as the receiver holds its choice set G and knows the
secret key sk, for each index, it can pre-compute k − 1 group exponentiation
operations associated with h without the knowledge of response from the sender.
When receiving a ciphertext from the sender, the receiver needs to perform k
pairing computations to retrieve k message. Therefore, the decryption cost is k
pairing computations in all, which is the same as that in [15].
4. Complex Assumptions
In this section, we define two specific Diffie-Hellman exponent problems in-
troduced by Boneh, Boyen and Goh [3] and denote them as (f, ĝ, F )-GDDHE
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and (f̂ , n)-DHE. The security of the proposed scheme relies on the correspond-
ing two defined assumptions. The former one is by slightly modifying the
(f, g, F )-GDDHE problem in [9]. We first give the definition of (f, ĝ, F )-GDDHE
as follows.
(f, ĝ, F )-GDDHE Problem.
Input: Let BG = (G,GT , e, p) be a bilinear group and g0 be a generator of
G. Let f(x) = (x + 1)(x + 2) · · · (x + n) ∈ Zp[x] and (x + t)2 - f(x), g(x) =
f(x)
(x+t)·
∏k
i=1 (x+li)
∈ Zp[x], where t, li ∈ [n] for i = 1, 2, · · · , k < n and all are
distinct. The following group elements are given
g0, g
a
0 , g
a2
0 , · · · , ga
n
0 , g
f(a)
0 ,
g
g(a)·(a+t)·b
0 ,
g
w·(a+t)
0 , g
w·(a+t)·a
0 , g
w·(a+t)·a2
0 , · · · , g
w·(a+t)·an
0 ,
and T ∈ GT , where a, b, t and w are unknown random exponents in Zp.
Output: a bit µ.
We define that the problem has been solved correctly if the output is
µ =
1 T = e(g0, g0)
w·b·f(a),
0 T 6= e(g0, g0)w·b·f(a).
Let us denote by I the input of the instance, true the event that T is indeed equal
to e(g0, g0)
w·b·f(a) and by false the event that T is a random element of GT . The
goal of (f, ĝ, F )-GDDHE is to decide whether T is equal to e(g0, g0)
w·b·f(a) or to
some random element of GT . We then define the advantage of an algorithm B
in solving the (f, ĝ, F )-GDDHE problem in BG as
Advgddhe(f, ĝ, F,B) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [B(I) = 1∣∣∣true]− Pr [B(I) = 1∣∣∣false] ∣∣∣∣,
where the probability is over all random choices and over the random coins of
B. We say that the (f, ĝ, F )-GDDHE assumption holds if for any probability
polynomial time algorithm B, we have Advgddhe(f, ĝ, F,B) is negligible.
Theorem 1. The defined (f, ĝ, F )-GDDHE problem is one of the GDDHE prob-
lems fulfilling the hardness conditions defined in [3].
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Proof. As the analysis in [9], the (f, ĝ, F )-GDDHE problem can be reformulated
as
P =

1, a, a2, · · · , an, f(a),
g(a) · (a+ t) · b,
w · (a+ t), w · (a+ t) · a,w · (a+ t) · a2, · · · , w · (a+ t) · an,
 ,
Q = 1,
F = w · b · f(a).
Now we proof that F is independent of 〈P,Q〉. We show this statement by
giving a contradiction as follows.
Assume that F is dependent of 〈P,Q〉 (i.e. F ∈ 〈P,Q〉 ), then there exists
not-all-zero coefficients {ai,j} and b1 such that
F =
∑
ai,jpipj + b1q1,
where pi, pj ∈ P and q1 = 1 ∈ Q. Noting that F = w · b · f(α), we have that, all
ai,jpipj should be multiples of w · b. Below we list all the possible products of
two polynomials from P which are multiples of w · b.
R =
 w · b · (a+ t)2 · g(a), w · b · a · (a+ t)2 · g(a),
w · b · a2 · (a+ t)2 · g(a), · · · , w · b · an · (a+ t)2 · g(a)
 .
If F ∈ 〈P,Q〉, we have
F = w · b · f(a) = w · b · (a+ t)2 ·A(a) · g(a)
where A(a) is a polynomial with deg(A(a)) ≤ n. We simplify the above equation
as follows,
f(a) = (a+ t)2 ·A(a) · g(a).
Therefore, we have (a+t)2|f(a), which is contradiction with (a+t)2 - f(a). The
assumption that F is dependent of 〈P,Q〉 cannot hold and hence F /∈ 〈P,Q〉.
This completes the proof.
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Definition 4 ((f̂ , n)-DHE-Problem). Let G be a cyclic group of prime or-
der p and g, h be two generators of G. The (f̂ , n)-DHE problem is, given(
g, g
1
a+1 , · · · , g
1
a+n , h, ha, ha
2
, · · · , han
)
for unknown a ∈ Zp, output
(
f(x), hf(a)
)
,
where f(x) ∈ Zp[x] is a polynomial function with degree n′ > n.
Suppose that q(x) = (a + 1)(a + 2) · · · (a + n) ∈ Zp and g = hq(x), we
can compute
(
g, g
1
a+1 , g
1
a+2 , · · · , g
1
a+n
)
from
(
h, ha, ha
2
, · · · , han
)
. That is, the
(f̂ , n)-DHE problem equals to the hard problem, given
(
h, ha, ha
2
, · · · , han
)
for
unknown a ∈ Zp, output
(
f(x), hf(a)
)
, where f(x) ∈ Zp[x] is a polynomial func-
tion with degree n′ > n, which is defined in [14]. We say that the (f̂ , n)-DHE
assumption holds if for any probability polynomial time algorithm B, the prob-
ability to solve the (f̂ , n)-DHE problem is negligible.
5. Security Analysis
We derive the security of our proposed scheme under (f, ĝ, F )-GDDHE as-
sumption and (f̂ , n)-DHE assumption.
5.1. Receiver Privacy
Theorem 2. For our scheme, receiver’s choices are unconditionally secure.
Proof. The simulator B establishes the system by choosing a security parameter
λ and a random α ∈ Z∗p. Then it generates the system parameter SP as(
BG, g, g
1
α+1 , g
1
α+2 , · · · g
1
α+n , h, hα, hα
2
, · · · , hα
n
)
.
Challenge: A outputs two distinct choice sets G0 = {l1, l2, · · · , lk0} and G1 =
{l′1, l′2, · · · , l′k1} where k0, k1 ≤ k. B picks a random sk ∈ Z
∗
p as the secret key.
Let T =
(
P(G),Σ, k
)
be generated from G = G0. We have
P(G) = g
sk∏k0
i=1 (α+li) , Σ = h
∏k0
i=1 (α+li)·α
n−k
sk .
For any distinct set G1 = {l′1, l′2, · · · , l′k1}, we define sk
′ ∈ Zp as
sk′ = sk ·
∏k1
i=1 (α+ l
′
i)∏k0
i=1 (α+ li)
.
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We have
P(G) = g
sk∏k0
i=1 (α+li) = g
sk′∏k1
i=1 (α+l
′
i) = P(G1),
Σ = h
∏k0
i=1 (α+li)·α
n−k
sk = h
∏k1
i=1 (α+l
′
i)·α
n−k
sk′ = Σ′,
such that (P(G0),Σ, k) = (P(G1),Σ
′, k). As sk is randomly chosen from Z∗p, we
have sk′ is also universally random in Z∗p. Thus, the distributions of (P(G),Σ, k)
for both G0 and G1 are identical. Adversary has no advantage in guessing the
receiver’s choice set in P(G). Thus, our scheme achieves unconditionally secure
for the choice of receiver. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
5.2. Sender Security
Theorem 3 (Indistinguishability). Our proposed scheme captures the indis-
tinguishability of sender’s security. That is, if the (f, ĝ, F )-GDDHE assump-
tion holds, the adversary (receiver) gets no information about secrets mi, where
i /∈ G.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A who can distinguish the secret with
advantage ε. We can construct an algorithm B that solves the (f, ĝ, F )-GDDHE
problem with advantage ε. Let BG = (G,GT , e, p) be a bilinear group, g0 be a
generator of G, L = {1, 2, · · · , n} be all secrets’ indices. All these objects are
known by A and B. B runs A and programs the reduction as follows.
Init: A outputs a set G∗ = {l∗1, l∗2, · · · , l∗k} ⊂ L and a target secret index I∗ ∈
L\G∗ for challenge.
Setup: To setup the system parameter, B requires an instant of the (f, ĝ, F )-
GDDHE problem where
t = I∗, f(x) =
∏n
i=1
(x+ i), g(x) =
f(x)
(x+ I∗) ·
∏k
i=1 (x+ l
∗
i )
,
and f(x) and g(x) have n degrees and (n−k−1) degrees respectively. B is then
given a (f, ĝ, F )-GDDHE instance in BG as:
g0, g
a
0 , g
a2
0 , · · · , ga
n
0 , g
f(a)
0 ,
g
g(a)·(a+I∗)·b
0 ,
g
w·(a+I∗)
0 , g
w·(a+I∗)·a
0 , g
w·(a+I∗)·a2
0 , · · · , g
w·(a+I∗)·an
0 ,
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and T ∈ GT , which is either equal to e(g0, g0)w·b·f(a) or to some random element
of GT . It implicitly sets α = a and
g = g
f(a)
0 , h = g
w(a+I∗)
0 ,
which are available from the first row and third row of the instance. Then for
gi, hi in the system parameter, we have
gi = g
1
α+i = g
f(a)
a+i
0 , hi = h
αi = g
w(a+I∗)·ai
0 ,
which can be computed from the group elements in the first row and third row
of the instance respectively. Then the system parameter SP is
SP = (BG, g, h, gi, hi : i = 1, 2, · · · , n) .
Challenge: A outputs
(
P(G∗), sk∗
)
and two secrets m0,m1 from the same
secret space for challenge. B first verifies that P(G∗) is indeed generated from G∗
by using the secret key sk∗. If the verification fails, it abouts. Otherwise, it picks
a random bit c ∈ {0, 1} and computes the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ = (C∗0 , CI∗)
as
C∗0 = g
sk∗·g(a)·(a+I∗)·b
0 , CI∗ = T ·mc.
C∗0 is computable from in the second row of the given instance. Let r
∗ = b, if
T = e(g0, g0)
w·b·f(a), we have
P(G∗) = g
sk∗
(α+l∗1)(α+l
∗
2)···(α+l
∗
k
) = g
sk∗·f(a)
(a+l∗1)(a+l
∗
2)···(a+l
∗
k
)
0 ,
C∗0 = g
sk∗·g(a)·(a+I∗)·b
0 = g
sk∗·f(a)·b
(a+l∗1)(a+l
∗
2)···(a+l
∗
k
)
0 = P(G
∗)
b
= P(G∗)r
∗
,
CI∗ = T ·mc
= e (g0, g0)
w·b·f(a) ·mc
= e
(
g
f(a)
a+I∗
0 , g0
)w·(a+I∗)·b
·mc
= e
(
g
1
a+I∗ , h
)b
·mc
= e
(
g
1
α+I∗ , h
)r∗
·mc.
Therefore, CT ∗ is a valid challenge ciphertext.
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Guess: A outputs its guess c′ of c.
This completes the description of the reduction. At the end, B outputs 1 as
the solution to the (f, ĝ, F )-GDDHE problem if c′ = c. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
In the above simulation, there is no abortion caused by that B cannot sim-
ulate. If T = e(g0, g0)
w·b·f(a), we have that the adversary will guess c correctly
with probability 12 + ε according to the assumption. Otherwise, we have CI∗ is
uniformly random and independent of C∗0 . The challenge ciphertext is a one-
time pad encryption, such that the adversary can only guess a correct c with
probability 12 . Therefore, the advantage of solving the (f, ĝ, F )-GDDHE problem
is also ε, e.g. Advgddhe(f, ĝ, F ) = ε. This yields the Theorem 3.
We note that the security of accountability is due to the fact that if |G| > k,
for example |G| = k + 1, the corresponding Σ = hsk
−1·αn−k
∑
i∈G(α+i) contains
the group element hα
n+1
which is not computable from the system parameter
SP . The proof is completed in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Accountability). Our OTkn scheme captures the accountability
of the sender security if the (f̂ , n)-DHE assumption holds.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A who can break accountability.
We can construct an algorithm B that solves the (f̂ , n)-DHE problem. Let(
g, g
1
a+1 , g
1
a+2 , · · · g
1
a+n , h, ha, ha
2
, · · · , han
)
be a random instance of (f̂ , n)-DHE
problem taken as input by B and its goal is to output
(
f(x), hf(a)
)
, where
f(x) ∈ Zp[x] is a polynomial function with degree n′ > n. B interacts with A
as the follows.
Setup: B implicitly sets α = a for unknown a and generates the system pa-
rameter as SP =
(
BG, g, g
1
a+1 , g
1
a+2 , · · · g
1
a+n , h, ha, ha
2
, · · · , han
)
.
Challenge: A outputs (P(G∗),G∗, sk∗) and k for challenge, where |G∗| > k and
P(G∗) = g
sk∗∏
li∈G∗
(a+li) .
Output: A outputs T ∗ = (P(G∗),Σ∗, k) and wins the game if the tuple (P(G∗),Σ∗, k)
passes the verification algorithm. In this case, we have
Σ∗ = hsk
∗−1·an−k·
∏
li∈G∗
(a+li).
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Let f(x) = sk∗−1 ·xn−k ·
∏
li∈G∗ (x+ li). We have f(x) is a polynomial function
in Zp with degree larger than n. B outputs (f(x),Σ∗) as the solution to the
(f̂ , n)-DHE problem. This completes the description of the simulation and we
obtain the Theorem 4.
6. Conclusion
We proposed an efficient two-round OTkn scheme with ideal communication
cost. Precisely, the receiver sends only two group elements and one integer to
the sender which are independent of the number of secrets held by the sender
and the number of receiver’s choice, while the number of messages from S to R
is n+ 1. Compared with the existing OTkn schemes in the literature, our scheme
achieves the minimum communication cost in both two rounds. We show that
our OTkn scheme is unconditionally secure for receiver’s choice and preserves the
sender security under the specific (f, ĝ, F )-GDDHE assumption and (f̂ , n)-DHE
assumption.
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